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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner/Appellee,

Case No. 20010761-CA

v.
MATTHEW L. DESPAIN,

Respondent/Appellant.

APPELLEE'S REHEARING PETITION

REHEARING ISSUE
Should this Court have decided whether the trial court erred in considering Officer
Slaugh's knowledge of defendant in determining whether Officer Olson had reasonable
suspicion to ask defendant about weapons where (1) neither party briefed the issue; (2) the
issue is one of first impression in Utah; (3) substantial case law allows attribution of
knowledge amongst officers working closely in concert; and (4) determination of the issue
was not necessary to the Court's final decision in this case?
CASE STATEMENT
Defendant was charged by information with operating a clandestine laboratory and
possession or use of a controlled substance with a prior conviction, both second degree
felonies; transportation or possession of items prohibited in a correctional or mental health
facility, a third degree felony; reckless endangerment, a class A misdemeanor; and

possession of drug paraphernalia and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, both class B
misdemeanors (R. 3-5). A forfeiture demand was also entered. (Id.) Defendant filed a
motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search of his vehicle and attached trailer
(R. 38-45). Following a hearing, the trial court entered a written ruling denying defendant's
motion (R. 46-52).
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to operation of a clandestine laboratory,
reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress (R. 64-71, 7475). Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of one to fifteen years (R. 7781).

That sentence was suspended, however, and defendant was ordered to serve nine

months in jail and 36 months probation (Id.). The court also ordered defendant's forfeiture
of $1,416.00 cash found in the search (R. 72-73).
Defendant timely appealed his conviction (R. 84-85). This Court affirmed his
conviction in a published opinion filed July 25, 2003. See State v. Despain, 2003 UT App
266 (attached at Addendum A).
ARGUMENT
The State seeks rehearing to address one sentence and its related footnote in the
Court's opinion that concluswily decides an issue of first impression in Utah that was not
briefed by the parties and that is not necessary to the Court's final decision:
Despain argues that the trial court erred in relying upon the prior
encounter between Slaugh and Despain to support its decision that
Olsen's question was supported by reasonable suspicion. We agree.3
However, "[i]t is well settled that we may affirm a judgment of a lower

2

court if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record." State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, U 31,994 P.2d 1243.4
State v. Despain, 2003 UT App 266, f 10. Footnote 3 then states:
The trial court relied on the prior contact between Slaugh and
Despain to support its decision to deny Despain's motion to suppress.
However, Slaugh merely asked Despain for his license and registration,
while it was Olsen who asked Despain about weapons. Moreover,
Olsen did not know of the prior encounter between Slaugh and Despain
and the testimony of Slaugh makes clear that Olsen had no reason to
believe anything more than a simple traffic stop was occurring prior to
their approaching the truck to complete the traffic stop. Accordingly,
because Olsen had no history with Despain and was not aware of
Slaugh's history with Despain, the trial court erred in considering the
prior encounter as material to the issue.
Id. at f 10 n.3. Footnote 3 includes no citation to legal authority.
For the reasons stated below, the State respectfully asks this Court to remove footnote
3 from its opinion and to amend paragraph 10 as follows:
Despain argues that the trial court erred in relying upon the prior
encounter between Slaugh and Despain to support its decision that
Olsen's question was supported by reasonable suspicion. We do not
reach this issue, however, because "[i]t is well settled that we may
affirm a judgment of a lower court if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record." State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT
10,1f 31, 994 P.2d 1243/
(alterations bolded and italicized). The State thus asks this Court to amend its opinion to
remove the challenged sentence and footnote and, as it did with another issue in this case,
"reserve [its] analysis of the [issue] for an appropriate case." Despain, 2003 UT 266, ^ 9 n.2.
The State does not seek to alter the result, and the corrections the State seeks will not
do so.

3

I.

Relevant proceedings.
At defendant's preliminary hearing, Officer Olson testified that he did not remember

Officer Slaugh telling him anything about defendant prior to stopping defendant's vehicle
(R. 87:82). Officer Olson, however, never ruled out that possibility. Rather, he testified,
"It's very possible. He could have" (R. 87:82). "I don't specifically recall the exact words,
but its possible" (R. 87:83).
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered in connection
with his arrest (R. 38-45). Defendant's memorandum in support of his motion did not
include any argument that Officer Olson lacked reasonable suspicion to question him about
weapons because Officer Olson lacked the knowledge Officer Slaugh had concerning him
(see id.).

In fact, throughout the memorandum, defendant referred to the officers

interchangeably, as if they were one (see id.).
At the suppression hearing, Officer Slaugh testified that, as soon as he heard that the
truck they were following was registered to defendant, he became concerned that defendant
might be armed because of a prior incident in which defendant had been found in possession
of a concealed weapon (R. 106:40). However, Officer Slaugh did not have a conversation
with Officer Olson before exiting their vehicle concerning defendant or Officer Slaugh's
prior encounter with him (R. 106:41-42). Officer Olson did not testify at the suppression
hearing.
In its suppression ruling, the trial court concluded:

4

As one officer is asking for a license, another officer was asking
whether Mr. Despain had any weapons. In light of the officer's
previously dealings with the defendant, approximately thirty days
before, he knew that he had been recently armed with a handgun and
considered armed and dangerous.
Therefore, in light of the very recent history, the inquiry, for
officer safety was authorized.
(R. 48).
In his docketing statement, defendant indicated that he wished to challenge "[w]hether
the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop [his] vehicle[;] and [w]hether the scope of the
subsequent detention exceeded justification for the stop." See Docketing Statement at 2.1
Nowhere did defendant indicate that he wished to address whether Officer Olson was aware
of Officer Slaugh's prior knowledge of defendant. See id.
In his brief on appeal, defendant treated Officers Slaugh and Olson as if both were
familiar with defendant from a prior arrest. See Aplt. Br. at 4 ("Olsen asked the question
about weapons because about one month earlier he had stopped the appellant [and] [a]t that
time the appellant was carrying a firearm."). None of his arguments challenged whether the
trial court properly considered defendant's prior contact with Officer Slaugh in concluding
that Officer Olson had reasonable suspicion to ask defendant about weapons. See Aplt. Br.
at 6-19. Rather, defendant only challenged generally whether the circumstances of the stop,
in conjunction with the officers' prior knowledge, provided reasonable suspicion to question
defendant about weapons. See id.

defendant raises two other issues in his docketing statement; however, neither
concerns the initial stop and questioning of defendant.
5

As a consequence, the State did not address any differences between Officer Slaugh's
knowledge and Officer Olson's knowledge—or the legal significance of any differences—in
its responsive brief See Aple. Br. at 7-22.
For the first time during oral argument, defense counsel distinguished between what
Officer Slaugh knew and what Officer Olson knew at the time defendant was questioned.
See 17 April 2003 Oral Argument. Defense counsel first noted that, at the suppression
hearing, Officer Slaugh testified that he did not tell Officer Olson about his prior encounter
with defendant before they stopped defendant for the taillight violation. See id. He then
noted that Officer Olson did not testify at the suppression hearing. See id. Counsel
concluded: "So what you've got is a situation that, an officer who we don't know if he knew
about the prior encounter, is asking about the weapons." Id.
When Judge Thome questioned counsel concerning whether the trial court could
consider Officer Slaugh's prior knowledge about defendant in rendering its decision, defense
counsel again stated, "Part of the problem with that though is, judge, that the officer who
asked the question is not the officer who was involved there." Id. Judge Thome then noted,
"From Judge Davis's ruling, it's not clear that that's what he found." Id. Counsel responded:
"[P]art of the problem with that is that... we don't know if Olson had that knowledge and
in terms of the reasonable suspicion analysis, I think we need to have some showing that
when asking the question . . . that particular officer had that as a basis of his suspicion." Id.
Judge Thome continued, "But if you're challenging that finding, don't you have to marshal
the evidence that would have supported Judge Davis's conclusion?" Id. Counsel concluded
6

that the evidence concerning Officer Slaugh's prior encounter was in the record; the only
question was whether Officer Olson knew about it. See id.
In response, the State argued that, even absent a determination of whether Officer
Olson knew about Officer Slaugh's prior interaction with defendant, there was an abundance
of reasonable suspicion to ask defendant about weapons. See id.
In its opinion, this Court agreed with the State that, even absent evidence that Officer
Olson knew about Officer Slaugh's prior knowledge of defendant, the evidence was
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to ask defendant about whether he had weapons.
See Despain, 2003 UT App 266, f 11. This Court nonetheless decided that, absent proof that
Officer Olson knew about Officer Slaugh's prior knowledge of defendant, "the trial court
erred in considering the prior encounter as material to the issue." See id., 2003 UT App 266,
Tf 10, n.3. This Court did so even while deciding not to reach another issue—which was
actually briefed by the parties—because "our conclusion that Despain's behavior following
the stop reasonably led the officers to believe that he was armed and dangerous forecloses
any need to [address that issue]." Id., 2003 UT App 266, J 9 n.2.
II.

This Court should amend its opinion to remove an unsupported ruling on
an issue of first impression that was not briefed by the parties.
"'It is generally inappropriate to raise issues at oral argument that have not been

designated as issues on appeal in a docketing statement or in the briefs.'" State v. Arviso,
1999 UT App 381, f 4 n.2,993 P.2d 894 (quoting State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987,994 (Utah
1989)).

7

The reasons for this rule are two-fold. "First, this rule protects the opposing party,
which receives no notice as to any issues not found in the docketing statement or briefs and
therefore has no chance to prepare to refute the unbriefed issues at oral argument with a
reasoned analysis supported by legal authority." Id. "Second," as in this case, "when
[defendant] raised this new issue at oral argument, he offered no supporting legal authority."
Id.
Thus, this Court generally does not reach issues raised only during oral argument. See
id. ("'It is . . . well settled that this court need not address issues that a party has not
briefed.'") (quotingMaack v. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570,575 n.3 (Utah
App 1994)); see also Gilleyv. Blackstock, 2002 UT App 414, \ 10n.2,61 P.3d 305 (refusing
to reach issue raised "[i]n earlier proceedings and at oral argument" where party "did not
argue this issue in her brief).
In this case, defendant did not challenge the trial court's assumption that Officer
Olson was aware of Officer Slaugh's prior encounter with defendant at trial, in his docketing
statement, or in his brief on appeal. Thus, the State had no opportunity to brief that issue on
the merits. Moreover, when he raised the issue at oral argument, defendant provided no legal
support for his claim that the trial court erred in relying on that assumption in finding
reasonable suspicion to question defendant about his weapons.
Under such circumstances, this Court should not have reached the merits of this issue
in its opinion. See Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, If 4 n.2. This is especially so where, as here,
a holding on this issue was not necessary to this Court's final decision. See Despain, 2003
8

UT App 266, T[ 10 ("However, *[i]t is well settled that we may affirm a judgment of a lower
court if if is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record.'") (citation
omitted). The State therefore respectfully asks this Court to amend its opinion to omit the
merits discussion of this issue.
HI.

This Court should amend its opinion to remove an unsupported ruling on
an unbriefed issue of first impression where other jurisdictions have
applied the "collective knowledge rule" under similar fact scenarios
In State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986), the supreme court held that,

"[i]n making a probable cause determination, a police officer is entitled to rely on
information gained from other officers."

The court then cited approvingly a case holding that

'"when officers are involved together in an operation and there is communication between
them, the collective knowledge of the officers is considered in determining whether there was
probable cause for the search.'" Id. at 1089 (quoting United States v. Esle, 743 F.2d 1465,
1476 (11th Cir. 1984)).
However, the State has found no Utah appellate court decision addressing the extent
to which Dorsey's "collective knowledge" rule applies in the absence of evidence of
communication between the officers.
The general rule appears to be that, when the officers at issue have not actually
worked together on a case, communication is absolutely required. See, e.g., Wayne R.
LaFave, Search & Seizure § 3.5(c), pp. 265-67 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter Search & Seizure]
(suggesting that rule requiring communication "is sound, and should unquestionably be
applied... where the officer who did possess the probable cause was not in close time-space
9

proximity to the questioned arrest or search."); State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Neb.
1992) (noting "collective knowledge of the law enforcement agency for which an officer acts
may provide the basis for a search and seizure, but some communication of that knowledge
to the officer conducting the search and seizure is required") (citation omitted).
However, "when this other officer is at hand, it is to be doubted whether [the
requirement of actual communication] is inevitably compelled." Search & Seizure, § 3.5(c)
at pp. 267-69 & n.75. In fact, a number of jurisdictions, including the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, have held or at least intimated that proof of actual communication is not required
when the officer having the information works in close proximity to the officer conducting
the search. See, e.g., United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491,1504 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Even
in the absence of evidence of communication among officers, however, when officers act
collectively it may sometimes be appropriate to look to their collective knowledge in
determining whether they behaved reasonably."); see also United States v. Ledford, 218 F.3d
684, 689 (7th Cir. 2000); State v. Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24, 30 (5th Cir. 1972); Smith v. State,
719 So. 2d 1018,1022-25 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1990); Commonwealth v. Wooden, 433 N.E.2d
1234, 1237 (Mass. App. 1982); State v. Bolton, 801 P.2d 98, 113 (N.M. App. 1990).
One reason for this exception to the general rule is that "communication among
officers during the exigencies of a stop or arrest may often be subtle or nonverbal." Shareef,
100 F.3d at 1504. Thus, this exception recognizes that officers who work closely together
may "convey suspicions through nonverbal as well as verbal cues." Shareef, 100 F.3d at
1504 n.6.
10

Another reason for the exception is that a search or seizure, inevitable because of one
officer's knowledge, should not be invalidated merely because a member of his team without
such knowledge acted before he did. See Ledford, 218 F.3d at 689 (holding that where
officers act in joint venture, court may properly consider knowledge of all officers: "Were
it otherwise, the validity of such jointly conducted searches might turn on the fortuity of
which officer happened to open a trunk or door, notwithstanding the fact that he and his
colleagues were acting in concert."); Ragsdale, 470 F.2d at 30 ("The fact that one member
of the team moved too swiftly" should not invalidate search where, had that member not
begun the search when he did, the other "would surely have commanded it."); Smith, 719 So.
2d at 1022-25 (holding that, where officer with knowledge is in close temporal and physical
proximity of search/arrest, fact that another officer beat him to punch does not defeat
reasonable suspicion because, if second officer had not conducted search, almost surely first
officer would have); Wooden, 433 N.E.2d at 1237 (holding that, although neither officer
alone had sufficient knowledge to support action, where officers "were working in concert,
and they were within an arm's reach of each other as well as the suspects whom they were
confronting," combining their knowledge to determine reasonableness of action was
appropriate); Bolton, 801 P.2d at 113 ("Although [first officer], the one who instructed
defendants to remain, did not possess the information [the second officer] had acquired, [the
second officer's] knowledge can validate the detention because of the certainty that... [he]
would not have permitted the truck to depart."). Cf. State v. Ochoa, 639 P.2d 365,368 (Ariz.
App. 1981) ("It would seem hypertechnical to hold that appellant's arrest was unreasonable
11

simply because the race to his location was won by the only officer of all involved who did
not know about the [additional information].").
In this case, both reasons support the trial court's consideration of Officer Slaugh's
knowledge here. First, although Officer Slaugh testified that he did not speak with Officer
Olson concerning his prior encounter with defendant, neither Slaugh nor Olson were
asked—nor was the trial court ever asked to determine—whether Slaugh had communicated
his concerns to Olson in some other manner, i.e., by general comments reflecting Slaugh's
concerns, or by nonverbal cues.

Under such circumstances, "[a] presumption of

communication" between officers working together so closely is appropriate. Shareef, 100
F.3datl504n.6.
Second, given Officer Slaugh's knowledge, inquiry by him about whether defendant
possessed weapons in this case was inevitable. The fact that Officer Olson "moved too
quickly and did what the more knowledgeable [Slaugh] would imminently and lawfully have
done," does not render the search unreasonable. Ochoa, 639 P.2d at 368; see also Ledford,
218 F.3d at 689; Ragsdale, 470 F.2d at 30; Smith, 719 So. 2d at 1022-25; Wooden, 433
N.E.2d at 1237; Bolton, 801 P.2d at 113.
Given the lack of authoritative Utah case law on this issue, and given the extensive
case law supporting the trial court's consideration of Officer Slaugh's knowledge in this case,
this Court should not have decided this issue in a conclusory fashion without citing any legal
authority and without briefing by the parties. This is especially so where, as previously
stated, a holding on this issue was not necessary to this Court's final decision. See Despain,
12

2003 UT App 266, U 10. The State therefore respectfully asks this Court to amend its
opinion to omit the merits discussion of this issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued, the Court should grant rehearing to correct the errors
identified above.
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 35(a), State's counsel certifies that this petition is
presented in good faith and not for delay.
DATED August i£_, 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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2003 WL 21707634
— P.3d —
(Cite as: 2003 WL 21707634 (Utah App.))
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED,
IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Matthew L. DESPAIN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20010761-CA.

llOkl 139 Most Cited Cases
121 Criminal Law €>=>1158(4)
110k! 158(4) Most Cited Cases
An appellate court reviews factual findings underlying
a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard;
however, it reviews the trial court's conclusions of law
based on these findings for correctness, with a measure
of discretion given to the trial judge's application of
legal standard to facts.
[31 Searches and Seizures C=>23
349k23 Most Cited Cases

July 25,2003..

Defendant was convicted on a conditional guilty plea
in the trial court, Fourth District, Heber Department,
Lynn W. Davis, J., of operating a clandestine drug
laboratory. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Thorne, J., held that circumstances that officers
encountered during traffic stop supported reasonable
belief that defendant was armed and dangerous, and
thus, officer's questioning of defendant concerning
weapons possession was justified.

To determine whether a search or a seizure is
constitutionally reasonable, an appellate court must first
determine whether officer's action was justified at its
inception; if so, it then considers whether resulting
detention was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
141 Automobiles €=>349(3)
48Ak349(3) Most Cited Cases
A traffic stop is justified at its inception when the stop
is incident to a traffic violation committed in an
officer's presence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

Affirmed.
Davis, J., filed opinion concurring and dissenting in
part.

HI Automobiles €=>349(18)
48Ak349(18>> Most Cited Cases
Circumstances that officers encountered during traffic
stop supported reasonable belief that defendant was
armed and dangerous, and thus, officer's questioning of
defendant concerning weapons possession was
justified; it was after nightfall when officers approached
defendant's vehicle, defendant ignored instruction to
meet officers at patrol car, and instead reentered cab of
his truck and closed door, and when defendant
complied with officer's repeated request to meet
officers at patrol car he approached them wearing shirt
that obscured from officers' view any object that he
may have secreted in or around his waistband. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4: U.C.A.1953. 58-37d-4.
121 Criminal Law €^>1139
Copr. © West 2003 No (

151 Automobiles €=>349(18)
48Ak349fl8) Most Cited Cases
During a traffic stop an officer may request a driver's
license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer
check, and issue a citation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
161 Automobiles €=^349(18)
48Ak349(18) Most Cited Cases
Any further temporary detention for investigative
questioning after fulfilling the purpose for initial traffic
stop constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has
probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further
illegality. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
171 Arrest C=?63.5(8)
35k63.5(8>) Most Cited Cases
Where police officer validly stops individual for
investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes
that individual may be armed and dangerous, officer
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Page 2
may conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of
individual, or question individual regarding presence of
weapons, to discover weapons that might be used
against him. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
M Arrest €=>63.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
If a Terry frisk, which may be limited to officer simply
asking about presence of weapons, is challenged by
defendant following his arrest, state must support
officer's action by presenting articulable facts that
would reasonably lead an objective officer to conclude
that suspect may be armed; basis for this policy is the
recognition that facts and circumstances unique to the
particular suspect and/or factual context may give rise
to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
1?1 Arrest C==>63.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
If a Terry frisk, or questioning of a citizen about the
presence of a weapon, is challenged by defendant
following his arrest, state must present articulable facts
that would reasonably lead an objective officer to
conclude that suspect may be armed. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
G. Fred Metos, McCaughey & Metos, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, Jeffrey T.
Colemere, Smart Schofield Shorter & Lunceford, and
Kirk M. Torgensen, Attorney Generals Office, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee.

Before Judges DAVIS, GREENWOOD, and
THORNE.

OPINION
THORNE, Judge:
*1 % 1 Defendant Matthew Despain appeals from his
conditional guilty plea to operating a clandestine drug
laboratory, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated Section 58-37d-4 (Supp.200n. We
affirm.

BACKGROUND
U 2 On November 6,1999, Despain, his wife, and their
young son were traveling southbound on SR 40, near
Heber, Utah. At about midnight, near the intersection of
SR 40 and SR 189, Heber City Police Officer Troy

Slaugh noticed that the license plate attached to
Despain's fifth wheel trailer was not properly lit.
Accordingly, Slaugh called dispatch with the license
plate number and learned that the vehicle belonged to
Despain. Slaugh immediately recognized that he had
had contact with Despain recently and that the previous
contact had resulted in Despain being charged with
both a narcotics violation and a concealed weapon
violation.
U 3 Armed with this information, Slaugh initiated a
traffic stop of Despain. Despain pulled over and Slaugh
parked behind the fifth-wheel trailer. Both Slaugh and
his partner, Officer Rusty Olsen, then got out of the
patrol car and cautiously approached Despain's vehicle.
As the officers neared the bed of Despain's truck,
Despain's rottweiler stood up, lunged toward Slaugh
and began barking furiously, causing both officers to
draw their sidearms and retreat back to the patrol car.
Slaugh then yelled for Despain, who at that point had
exited his truck, to meet the officers near the patrol car,
away from the truck and the dog. Despain, instead, got
back into the cab of the truck and closed the door,
obscuring his subsequent actions from the officers'
view. Slaugh again yelled to Despain, ordering him to
meet the officers by the patrol car. Despain then exited
the truck and walked back to the officers.
f 4 While he walked, both officers noticed that
Despain was dressed in blue jeans and a very loose,
baggy shirt that hung down over his hips. When he
reached the officers, Slaugh asked for Despain's driver
license and registration while Olsen asked Despain if he
was carrying any weapons on his person. Despain
admitted that he had two knives and began reaching
toward his waist. Olsen intervened, grabbing and
searching Despain, whereupon he discovered and
confiscated two knives. Thefirstknife, a smaller knife
with a folding blade, was attached vertically to
Despain's belt and was in a secured covered sheath. The
second knife, however, was a large heavy knife with a
fixed blade, loosely placed in a sheath attached
horizontally across Despain's belly unsecured by either
a cover or a strap. After a short consultation, Slaugh
placed Despain under arrest for possession of a
concealed dangerous weapon. The officers then
conducted a search of the vehicle incident to the arrest
and discovered evidence that Despain intended to
produce, or was in the process of producing,
methamphetamine. [FN 11
H 5 Following his arrest, the State charged Despain
with possession or operating a clandestine drug
laboratory, possession or use of a controlled substance
by a person with a prior conviction, transportation or
possession of items prohibited in a correctional and
mental health facility, reckless endangerment,
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possession of drug paraphernalia, and carrying a
concealed dangerous weapon. Despain filed a motion to
suppress all evidence discovered as a result of Olsen's
question, arguing that the question was not supported
by reasonable suspicion. Thus, Despain argues his
arrest and the subsequent search of his vehicle incident
to the arrest were unconstitutional. On November 15,
2000, the trial court conducted a suppression hearing.
The court then denied Despain's motion, following
which Despain entered into a plea agreement with the
State, pleading guilty to the clandestine drug lab
charge. In accepting the plea agreement, pursuant to
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct.App.1988),
Despain preserved the suppression issue for appeal.
ANALYSIS
*2 [11121 ^16 Despain argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered
as a result of Olsen's question concerning weapons
possession. " 'We review the factual findings
underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a
motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous
standard.' " State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35, «1 9. 999 P.2d 7
(quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 n. 4 (Utah
1994)). "However, we review the trial court's
conclusions of law based on these findings 'for
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the
trial judge's application of the legal standard to the
facts.' " I£ (quoting State v. Moreno. 910 P.2d 1245,
1247 (Utah Ct.App.1996)).
r31f4H"5H"61 H 7 "To determine whether a search or a
seizure is constitutionally reasonable, we must first
determine whether the officer's action was' "justified at
its inception." ' " State w Chapman. 921 P.2d 446, 450
(Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127,
1132 (Utah 1994) (additional citation omitted)). "If so,
we then consider whether the resulting detention was'
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified the interference in the first place." ' " Id.
(citations omitted). "[A] traffic stop is justified at its
inception when 'the stop is "incident to a traffic
violation committed in [an officer's] presence."'" State
v.Hansen, 2002 UT 125,130,63 P3d 650 (alterations
in original) (citations omitted). Moreover, "during a
traffic stop an officer 'may request a driver's license and
vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and
issue a citation.'" hi at 1f 31 (quoting Lopez. 873 P.2d
at 1132) (additional citations omitted)."' "Any further
temporary detention for investigative questioning after
[fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic stop" '
constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has
probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further
illegality." fd_ (quoting State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d
652, 655 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (alteration in original)
(additional citations omitted)).

[71[8H8 However," '[w]here a police officer validly
stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes
and reasonably believes that the individual may be
armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a "frisk"
or "pat-down" search of the individual, [or question the
individual regarding the presence of weapons,] to
discover weapons that might be used against him.' "
State v. Warren. 2001 UT APP 346, <1 13, 37 P.3d 270
(quoting State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah
1985)), cert granted, 2002 Utah LEXIS 152. However,
if the Terry frisk, which may be limited to the officer
simply asking about the presence of weapons, is
challenged by the defendant following his arrest, "the
State must [support the officer's action by] presenting]
articulable facts that would reasonably lead an objective
officer to conclude that the suspect may be armed." Id.
at114 (quoting Carter. 707 P.2d at 659).
*3 U 9 In the instant case, there is no question, and
Despain does not argue otherwise, that the traffic stop
was justified at its inception. The license plate on
Despain's fifth-wheel trailer was not properly
illuminated, thus, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 41-6-120(b) (1998), Slaugh and Olsen were
justified in stopping Despain to cite him for the
violation. However, it is also clear that Olsen's
questioning of Despain concerning weapons possession
lies outside the scope of the reason for the initial stop.
Therefore, we must determine whether the
circumstances that the officers encountered during the
stop supported either "a reasonable suspicion of a
further illegality" sufficient to justify the question,
Hansen. 2002 UT 125 at % 31, 63 P.3d 650. or the
reasonable belief that Despain was armed and
dangerous. See Warren. 2001 UT APP 346 at T 13, 37
P.3d270. TFN21
K 10 Despain argues that the trial court erred in relying
upon the prior encounter between Slaugh and Despain
to support its decision that Olsen's question was
supported by reasonable suspicion. We agree. I FN31
However, "[i]t is well settled that we may affirm a
judgment of a lower court if it is sustainable on any
legal ground or theory apparent on the record." State v.
Finlavson. 2000 UT 10,11 31, 994 P.2d 1243. [FN41
£91 ^111 In the instant case, the record supports Olsen's
actions because the circumstances surrounding the
traffic stop support a reasonable belief that Despain was
armed and dangerous." 'Where a police officer validly
stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes
and reasonably believes that the individual may be
armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a "frisk"
or "patdown" search of the individual, [or question the
individual regarding the presence of weapons,] to
discover weapons that might be used against him.' "
Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at T 13, 37 P.3d 270
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(quoting Carter, 707 P.2d at 659. However, if the Tcm>
frisk, or the questioning of a citizen about the presence
of a weapon, is challenged by the defendant following
his arrest, "the State must present articulable facts that
would reasonably lead an objective officer to conclude
that the suspect may be armed." Id. at 1 14 (quoting
Carter, 707 P.2d at 659). The basis for this policy is the
recognition that "facts and circumstances unique to the
particular suspect and/or factual context may give rise
to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed."
Warren. 2001 UT APP 346 at T 15, 37 P.3d 270.
f 12 Here, it was well after nightfall when the officers
approached Despain's vehicle. Before they reached the
cab of the truck, they were accosted by an apparently
dangerous dog, prompting both officers to draw their
sidearms and retreat to their patrol car where Slaugh
noticed for the first time that Despain had dismounted
his vehicle. Slaugh then instructed Despain to meet the
officers at the patrol car, an instruction which Despain
completely ignored. He instead reentered the cab of his
truck and closed the door concealing any actions he
may have taken within the truck. When Despain finally
complied with Slaugh's repeated request to meet the
officers at the patrol car he approached them wearing
an untucked, overly-large shirt that obscured from the
officers' view any object that Despain may have
secreted in or around his waistband.
*4 f 13 Based on the factual circumstance of this case,
we conclude that an objective police officer in Olsen's
position would have drawn a similar conclusion-that
Despain may in fact be armed and dangerous~and that
an objective officer, concerned for his safety and the
safety of others, would have asked Despain the same
question. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at 11 14, 37
P.3d 270 (quoting Carter, 707 P.2d at 659). Thus, we
conclude that Olsen's question to Despain was
supported by a reasonable suspicion that Despain was
armed and dangerous.

K 16 I concur with the majority's analysis through
footnote 3, together with its recital of the law applicable
to "frisk" or "patdown" searches or questions about the
presence of weapons.
K 17 Since we are bound by the record and caselaw
respecting Officer Olsen's apparently limited
knowledge, and must approach this case accordingly, I
cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that Officer
Olsen had reasonable, articulable suspicion to inquire
whether Despain possessed any weapons. "
'Investigative questioning that further detains the driver
must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more
serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means
suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn
from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer
at the time of the stop.' " Stare v. Lafond. 2003 UT App
101. % 13, 68 P.3d 1043 (citations omitted), cert,
denied, 72 P.3d 685,2003 Utah LEXIS 59 (Utah 2003).
"The legality of a frisk for weapons[ or a question
regarding weapons], absent probable cause, is governed
by Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,20 L.Ed.2d
889 0968), and fUtah Code Ann. S 77-7-16 (1999)1."
Lafond 2003 UT App 101 at 11 18, 68 P.3d 1043
(footnote omitted).
K 18 Two basic scenarios warrant a Terry frisk for
weapons: (1) the "facts and circumstances unique to the
particular suspect and/or factual context"; and (2) "the
inherent nature of the crime being investigated." Id. at
*f 19 (quotations and citations omitted). Under the first
scenario, the "facts and circumstances" that "may give
rise to reasonable suspicion [that a] suspect may be
armed" include bulges in clothing or other items
appearing to be weapons; or a suspect who denies
possessing a weapon, yet aggressively approaches an
officer. Id_ (quotations and citations omitted). Factors
that do not amount to reasonable, articulable suspicion
include a suspect's wearing of layered, baggy clothing;
or mere nervousness not accompanied with aggressive
or threatening behavior. See id. at T«l 20-21.

CONCLUSION
H 14 Based on Despain's conduct during the traffic
stop, it was reasonable for Olsen to believe that
Despain was possibly armed and dangerous.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of
Despain's motion to suppress.

H 151 CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge.

DAVIS, Judge (concurring and dissenting):

U 19 Under the second scenario, the types of crimes
whose nature "suggests] the presence of weapons
include: robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons,
homicide, and dealing in large quantities of narcotics."
Id. at T 19 (quotations and citations omitted). Lesser
traffic offenses do not fit within this category. For
lesser traffic offenses we have required "particular facts
[to] lead [an] officer to believe that a suspect is armed."
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
*5 H 20 Neither scenario existed in this case. Officers
Slaugh and Olsen stopped Despain because the license
plate light on his trailer was not lighted and after they
ascertained the trailer was registered to Despain.
Officer Slaugh remembered Despain from a prior
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encounter that resulted in narcotics and concealed
weapon charges. Apparently, Officer Slaugh did not
communicate this information to Officer Olsen, and
Officer Olsen testified that he had no knowledge of
Despain's prior encounter with Officer Slaugh. The
majority then holds that the following facts establish
that Officer Olsen had reasonable, articulable suspicion
to ask Despain about weapons: Despain approached the
officers "wearing an untucked, overly large shirt that
[could have] obscured any object that [he] may have
[hidden] in his waistband"; Despain exited the cab of
his truck, re-entered the cab, closed the door (thus
"completely ignor [ing]" the officers), and then
re-exited the cab; the officers encountered "an
apparently dangerous dog" in the bed of the truck; and
the traffic stop occurred at night.
H 21 In my view, these circumstances do not amount to
reasonable, articulable suspicion. First, there was no
evidence that would indicate that Officer Olsen could
reasonably believe that Despain possessed weapons on
his body. No evidence was presented that Despain's
clothing exhibited bulges or any other indications of
weapons that would warrant a question regarding
weapons. See id. Rather, Officer Olsen could point only
to Despain's untucked, overly large shirt that may have
obscured any weapon hidden in Despain's waistband.
This court has found that "baggy, layered clothing,"
does not amount to reasonable, articulable suspicion by
itself. Id. at 121. Similarly, Officer Olsen's belief that
Despain may have tucked away a weapon in his
waistband, absent any evidence that would otherwise
indicate the presence of a weapon, does not amount to
reasonable, articulable suspicion. See id_ (noting that
"officer's testimony that he performed a patdown search
because suspect' "potentially may have been armed"...
add[ed] nothing' to the reasonable suspicion
determination because '[i]n every encounter with a
citizen by the police, the citizen may potentially be
armed.' " (alterations in original) (quoting People v.
Dickev. 21 Cal.App.4th 952. 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 44, 46
(1994))); cf. State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah
Ct.App.1993) (holding that "simply wearing a winter
coat" is not a factor that would indicate whether a
suspect was armed).
% 22 Second, there was no evidence that Despain
aggressively approached the officers. See Lafond, 2003
UT App 101 at % 20.68 P.3d 1043. Although Despain
re-entered the cab when the officersfirstordered him to
approach them, he eventually complied and walked
toward them. While the majority argues that Despain
"completely ignored" the officers' request, this
characterization is an overstatement. There is no
evidence that indicates how long Despain "ignored" the
officers' request to approach. The record does show that
Despain exited the cab and approached the officers

after the officers' second order. Logic suggests that
Despain re-entered the cab of his vehicle to retrieve
documentation, particularly when confronted by two
police officers with their dangerous weapons drawn.
*6 % 23 While it makes sense for the officers to retreat
from the "apparently dangerous dog," I fail to see how
this creates a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
Despain may have been armed. If anything, the
presence of Despain's dangerous dog cuts against the
notion that Despain would feel the need to carry
weapons.
U 24 Finally, the majority factors the nighttime traffic
stop into its reasonable, articulable suspicion analysis.
I fail to see how a nighttime traffic stop creates a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that an individual may
be armed. Individuals may be armed day or night. Our
law requires officers to point to "specific, articulable
facts" regarding the suspect to allow an officer to
conduct a Teny frisk or to question a suspect for
weapons. Id. at*i 13 (quotations and citations omitted).
The time of day of a police encounter adds nothing
relevant to the reasonable, articulable suspicion
analysis.
% 25 Based on the foregoing, I dissent from the
majority's conclusion that Officer Olsen had reasonable,
articulable suspicion to inquire whether Despain had
any weapons.

FN1. Despain does not challenge the officer's
search of his vehicle and trailer incident to his
arrest.

FN2. The State urges this court to adopt a rule
that would make an officer's inquiry into the
presence of weapons reasonable per se
regardless of whether the question is
supported by other reasonable suspicion. See
United States v. Holt. 264 F.3d 1215 J 225-26
(10th Cir.2001) (concluding that an officer's
questioning of a motorist concerning the
presence of a loaded weapon does not violate
the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Thus, in the Tenth Circuit,
questions concerning loaded weapons are
considered to be within the normal course of
a traffic stop.). Without addressing the
applicability of Holt to the instant case, we
decline to adopt such a rule because (1)
adopting such a position would be contrary to
existing supreme court doctrine, see State v
Hansen. 2002 UT 125. IT 30-32, 63 P.3d 650
(highlighting the limited and prescribed
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behavior allowed by police officers during the
temporary detention of a citizen); and (2) our
conclusion that Despain's behavior following
the stop reasonably led the officers to believe
that he was armed and dangerous forecloses
any need to adopt the position urged by the
State. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to
the traditional confines of police-citizen
encounters and reserve our analysis of the
State's suggestion for an appropriate case.
FN3. The trial court relied on the prior contact
between Slaugh and Despain to support its
decision to deny Despain's motion to suppress.
However, Slaugh merely asked Despain for
his license and registration, while it was Olsen
who asked Despain about weapons. Moreover,
Olsen did not know of the prior encounter
between Slaugh and Despain and the
testimony of Slaugh makes clear that Olsen
had no reason to believe anything more than a
simple traffic stop was occurring prior to their
approaching the truck to complete the traffic
stop. Accordingly, because Olsen had no
history with Despain and was not aware of
Slaugh's history with Despain, the trial court
erred in considering the prior encounter as
material to the issue.
FN4. Despain does not challenge the trial
court's factual findings; thus, we accept them
as drafted by the court.
END OF DOCUMENT
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